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HOW DO EMERGING MULTINATIONALS CONFIGURE POLITICAL 
CONNECTIONS ACROSS INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS? 
 
Research summary 
 Forming informal ties with political agents is viewed as a viable strategy for 
multinational enterprises seeking to enter emerging countries. Less is known about the 
conditions under which political connection is most helpful for firms dealing with cross-
border institutional distance. We discuss the distinctive mechanisms through which emerging 
multinationals may benefit from both home and host political connections. Based on the 
strategy tripod perspective, we postulate that the importance of different types of connections 
depends on the overall configurations of a firm’s resources and industry characteristics, and 
these may change with institutional distance. Our analysis of a sample of Chinese high-tech 
manufacturing firms yields new insights into political connections, institutional distance and 
the strategy tripod perspective. 
Managerial summary 
 Political connections play an important role in firms’ international expansion. In this 
study, we consider the importance of home political connections and host political 
connections in overcoming institutional barriers to foreign entry. We show that this 
importance varies, depending on firms’ resource base and industry dynamics, and it may 
switch from a useful asset to a dispensable one under certain circumstances. We reach our 
conclusion from an analysis of Chinese high-tech manufacturing firms’ foreign direct 
investment. 
Keywords: political connection, institutional distance, the strategy tripod perspective, fuzzy-





Institutional distance has been of lasting interest to international business (IB) scholars, since 
it summarizes “the barrier to international operations arising from discrimination by 
government, by consumers, and by suppliers” (Hymer, 1976: 34). Some argue that 
“international management is management of distance” (Zaheer, Schomaker, and Nachum, 
2012: 19). While institutional distance by and large deters foreign investors (Berry, Guillen, 
and Zhou, 2010), why and how multinational enterprises (MNEs) can overcome distance-
induced “costs of doing business” or “liability of foreignness” has become one of the big 
questions in IB that defines its disciplinary distinctiveness (Peng, 2004; Zaheer, 1995). 
Differences in formal and informal institutions pose a particular barrier to the global 
expansion of emerging multinationals (EMNEs), which are already constrained by their 
inadequate resources and market-based capabilities (Peng, 2012). 
A promising explanation of EMNEs’ global strategy lies in the institution-based view 
of strategy (Peng et al., 2009). Research on advanced-country MNEs (AMNEs) suggests that 
they rely upon political connections – notably managers’ interpersonal ties with public 
officials at various administration levels and from different branches of the government – 
when venturing into emerging economies, and this is in reaction to the salient differences in 
the institutional environment (Li, Poppo, and Zhou, 2008; Luo, 2001). It is conceivable that 
similar strategies may be employed by EMNEs, which can arguably derive home-country 
based advantages from familiarity with such strategies in many emerging markets (Peng and 
Luo, 2000; Shi, Markóczy, and Stan, 2014). However, IB research has yet to explore whether 
and how political connections with the home and host authorities help EMNEs address 
institutional differences when entering foreign markets. Recent political connection literature 
lays strong emphasis on its contingent value (Sun, Mellahi, and Wright, 2012). Whether 
political connections are of use may depend on the type of networks (Sun et al., 2015) and 
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intraorganizational and environmental factors (Sun et al., 2012). One example is that firms’ 
ownership ties with the home government could impair their legitimacy in certain foreign 
countries (Meyer et al., 2014). Conjoining the inquiries of distance and political connections 
offers various opportunities to extend the literature. First and foremost, it begs these 
questions: 1) whether the efficacy of political connections in overcoming institutional 
differences depends on other factors known to affect EMNEs’ international expansion; and 2) 
how the importance of certain connections changes with institutional distance.  
In this paper, we elucidate whether, and under what conditions, managers’ personal 
connections with the home and host government facilitate EMNEs’ expansion to 
institutionally distant countries. We focus on the level of using political connections (Luo, 
2003), rather than the process or structure of networking per se, or its heterogeneous types 
(cf. Sun et al., 2015). The use of connections reflects managers’ desire to rely on networking 
and its perceived value in responding to organizational needs and environmental dynamics in 
the particular context. Given that political networking incurs significant cost and its effect 
depends largely on the structure of the institutional setting (Brockman, Rui, and Zou, 2013; 
Choi, Jia, and Lu, 2015), we view this non-market strategy as firms’ strategic response to 
potential frictions in the environment in which they operate or aspire to operate (Sojli and 
Tham, 2017), in line with the institution-based view. Specifically, we examine the importance 
of political connections during the early process of entry, where institutional differences are 
arguably the most salient. To address the first question, we employ the strategy tripod 
perspective and fuzzy-set analysis to explore how resource-based and industry-based factors 
may complement political connections for EMNEs to venture in high-distance countries (we 
refer to ‘institutional distance’ hereafter). To answer the second question, we compare the 
configurations of strategy tripod factors in high-distance and low-distance countries. 
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We contribute to the literature in three respects. First, we advance the political 
connections research in the non-market strategy literature (Mellahi et al., 2016), which has 
focused predominantly on political connections in domestic contexts (Haveman et al., 2017; 
Shi et al., 2014). While recent studies examine the effect of home country and foreign 
political connections on firms’ outward internationalization (Du and Luo, 2016; Sojli and 
Tham, 2017), what remain underexplored are the complementary conditions under which 
political networking is best suited to overcome institutional barriers to foreign entry, and can 
best help EMNEs take hold in distant countries. We reveal that high-distance investments are 
associated with the use of different types of connections, depending on the gestalts of firms’ 
resource base and industry dynamics. Rather than assuming political connections as a 
universal asset for internationalizing firms, we show that, in certain cases, the utility of non-
market strategy changes across institutional contexts. Second, we contribute to the distance 
literature. While there is consensus that institutional distance generally poses significant 
challenges to MNEs, a meaningful question remains unanswered as to why some MNEs, and 
particularly EMNEs, are not constrained by institutional distance. Therefore, we contrast our 
study with the conventional approach, and treat institutional distance as the outcome variable. 
Extant research pays insufficient attention to low-distance investments, which presumably 
incur negligible costs due to the linear effect of distance embedded in the regression approach 
(Gaur and Lu, 2007; Shenkar, 2001). Our analysis points to asymmetric causality, in that 
investment in low-distance countries does not constitute simply a mirror image of 
configurations associated with high-distance investments. Thirdly, we contribute to the 
strategy tripod literature. The essence of the strategy tripod perspective is to account for 
interactions of the three legs of the tripod. A regression-based approach has inhibited 
previous studies from unravelling this intricacy. Our set-theoretic design makes this paper 





At the very foundation of IB lies the assumption that MNEs operate at a disadvantage relative 
to domestic firms (Hymer, 1976). This liability of foreignness emanates largely from cross-
national variations in the institutional environment (Xu and Shenkar, 2002; Zhou and Guillen, 
2016). Institutions refer to humanly devised structures guiding and constraining human 
interactions (North, 1990), including “political institutions such as the regime type, the 
national structure of policy-making and the judicial system, economic institutions such as the 
structure of the national factor markets and the terms of access to international factors of 
production and socio-cultural factors such as informal norms, customs, mores and religions” 
(Mudambi and Navarra, 2002: 638). Institutional economists posit that the degree of 
dissimilarity between institutions in the home and host country determines the level of 
uncertainty for MNEs when engaging with local political agents, and raises hurdle rates of 
return (Mudambi and Navarra, 2002). This uncertainty is intertwined with unfamiliarity 
hazards, i.e., information asymmetry arising from the lack of knowledge of the host country, 
and discrimination hazards, i.e., discriminatory treatment by host country stakeholders (Eden 
and Miller, 2004). Thus, the liability of foreignness is not confined to costs and legal burdens 
exclusive to foreign firms; it also entails institutional benefits denied to outsiders, including 
government subsidies, favorable policy treatments and exclusive contract arrangements. The 
probability of survival is lower when MNEs have to overcome higher institutional distance 
between the home and host country (Gaur and Lu, 2007), and thus they tend to refrain from 
investing in institutionally distant markets (Berry, Guillen, and Zhou, 2010). 
Undoubtedly the construct of institutional distance has significantly improved our 
understanding of FDI. Empirical research sheds light on how institutional distance – as an 
independent, exogenous factor – influences MNEs’ global strategies, including foreign entry, 
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country selection, entry mode and ownership level, and its restrictive role is well documented 
(Berry et al., 2010; Zhou and Guillen, 2016). However, it leaves an intriguing question 
underexplored as to why some MNEs can overcome high institutional distance. The question 
is especially perplexing for two reasons. First, research suggests that costs stemming from 
institutional differences may accelerate at higher levels of the dyadic distance (Gaur and Lu, 
2007). Disproportionate challenges are implied when MNEs expand to host countries far 
removed in institutional terms from the home environment. Second, latecomer EMNEs rarely 
possess significantly superior technological and managerial resources (Peng, 2012). Nor do 
they necessarily have stronger non-market competence over AMNEs in overcoming 
institutional distance (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2011). The recent global catch-up by 
EMNEs thus poses greater challenges to the conventional wisdom. We suggest that, above 
and beyond the established, independent role of institutional distance, new insights would 
accrue from describing those EMNEs that are successfully overcoming institutional distance.  
It is theorized that institutional distance drives liabilities of foreignness in a linear 
fashion: the larger the institutional distance to overcome, the greater the liability of 
foreignness, and the more difficulty and pressures the MNE must deal with (Eden and Miller, 
2004; Zhou and Guillen, 2016). This linearity is reinforced – rather than tested – by the 
mechanics of regression commonly used in previous research. One implication is that, when 
institutional distance is sufficiently low, the difficulties for MNEs to overcome, in addition to 
what domestic firms have to bear, become negligible (Gaur and Lu, 2007). One might reason 
that investing in institutionally proximate countries may not be significantly different to 
domestic venturing, in that existing organizational practices and knowledge are readily 
transferable to a neighboring market. This is often assumed – by researchers and by 
practitioners alike – rather than challenged (Shenkar, 2001). However, case studies suggest 
that this is an illusion, and managers often fall into a confidence trap by underestimating the 
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complexity of low-distance investments (O'Grady and Lane, 1996). In fact, similarities and 
differences between the home and host country have distinct impacts on internationalization 
decisions. We therefore posit that, not only would there be threshold requirements for low-
distance FDI, these investments may also rely upon distinct configurations of internal and 
external factors, once we relax the assumption of linearity of the distance effect.  
Political connections 
Connecting with political agents has been recognized as one of the generic strategies for 
firms in dealing with institutional pressures, because it creates various values, including 
“preferential treatment by government-owned enterprises (such as banks or raw material 
producers), lighter taxation, preferential treatment in competition for government contracts, 
relaxed regulatory oversight of the company in question, or stiffer regulatory oversight of its 
rivals, and many other forms” (Faccio, 2006: 369). In this paper, we define political 
connections as managers’ social and relational ties with public officials at various 
administration levels and from different branches of the government. This definition is 
closely in line with previous studies (Li and Zhang, 2007; Luo, 2001; Peng and Luo, 2000), 
but broader than those focusing on political affiliations (e.g., Cui and Jiang, 2012). Managers 
act as boundary spanners to engage with external agents upon which their firms depend, 
including government officials. Research suggests that such political connections are widely 
employed by domestic firms in emerging economies, particularly China (Li and Zhang, 2007; 
Peng and Luo, 2000). Given the government’s active role in allocating resources in the 
strategic factor market, it becomes imperative for Chinese firms to build informal ties with 
numerous government agencies in pursuit of survival and growth (Wu, Li, and Li, 2012).  
For FDI, political connections may exert an even stronger influence on MNEs’ 
strategic activities, considering the monopoly of power exercised by governments over MNEs 
and the former’s control of location-specific advantages (Boddewyn, 1988). MNEs may 
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derive three main benefits from ties with home and host governments. First, the home country 
government controls critical resources in the competitive environment. Emerging economies 
are characterized by imperfect domestic factor markets, where the government has discretion 
over distributing bank loans, subsidies and favorable regulations, particularly in relation to 
FDI (Buckley et al., 2007; Luo, Xue, and Han, 2010). Research shows that political 
connections in terms of home government ownership grant easier access to financial aid, 
preferential incentives, administrative assistance and potential bailout, in support of domestic 
firms’ international expansion (Cui and Jiang, 2012). In the event of conflict with the host 
country, these firms are also well-placed to mobilize the home government to protect their 
overseas investments (Duanmu, 2014). Second, host country political elites confer political 
legitimacy on foreign firms. The lack of legitimacy is considered a major source of 
uncertainty for MNEs. Political connections signal the endorsement and acceptance by host 
government officials, which provides a “social license” to operate and increases MNEs’ 
credibility in the eyes of the public (Luo, 2001). Third, both home and host country 
governments offer crucial access to regulatory and industrial information. Well-connected 
firms enjoy lead knowledge of upcoming laws, regulations and outward investment policies 
through ties with home officials, and are poised to seize the strategic opportunities opened up 
by policy changes (Shi et al., 2014). In China, the information as to which countries and 
industries will be preferred by the government and included in the next Guidance Catalogue 
of Countries and Industries for Overseas Investment may be but one example (Lu et al., 
2014). In the host country, information passed on through political channels is also important 
for outsiders in reducing environmental uncertainty (Johanson and Vahlne, 2009). Exploiting 
information asymmetry allows MNEs to derive competitive advantages from unnatural 
market imperfections (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994). These advantages only accrue to 
politically connected firms, whether in the home or host countries. 
9 
 
However, caution needs to be exercised, since political connections do not come 
without a price. Dependence on external agents invites the risk of losing the firm’s autonomy 
(Mellahi et al., 2016). Firms are exposed to pressures of aligning resource allocation with the 
political agents’ own agendas, and there is a need to develop separate strategies to manage 
contradictory and potentially predatory demands from these agents (Dieleman and 
Boddewyn, 2012). IB research implies that beneficial political connections could turn into a 
liability as the institutional context changes – either across the border (Meyer et al., 2014) or 
over the progression of economic liberalization (Sun, Mellahi, and Thun, 2010). Partnering 
with the wrong agents at the wrong time may even incur significant social and economic 
costs for the MNE (Siegel, 2007). From managerial perspectives, utilizing political 
connections to penetrate a foreign market is an endogenous decision, taking into account the 
expected returns and costs from developing and maintaining the ties (Luo, 2003).  
The strategy tripod perspective 
Traditionally, the explanation of firms’ strategy rests upon two dominant theoretical 
foundations. The industry-based view posits that the conditions with the industry in which a 
firm operates determine strategies (Porter, 1980). The resource-based view complements this 
proposition by attributing within-industry variations in firm strategy to firm-specific 
resources (Barney, 1991). Nevertheless, IB research, in its attempts to understand firms’ 
global strategy, often assigns primacy to the wider context of competition, at home or abroad. 
This raises appreciation that institutions – the “rules of the game” by which competition is 
organized (North, 1990) – matter in shaping firm strategy. The institution-based view is 
particularly germane in explaining the internationalization of EMNEs, as it brings to the 
forefront some of the distinctive characteristics of the institutional environment from which 
they originate. For instance, the rise of Chinese MNEs has drawn much attention to the 
supportive role of home country governments behind firms’ internationalization (Lu et al., 
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2014; Luo et al., 2010) and the mechanisms through which connections with the home 
country government may influence foreign entry (Cui and Jiang, 2012; Meyer et al., 2014).  
 The term ‘strategy tripod’ is coined to highlight the importance of combining the 
three theoretical strands in search of an integrative platform upon which further explorations 
can be sought (Peng et al., 2009). While it seems established that the industry-based, 
resource-based and institution-based views each individually account for a non-trivial portion 
of variance in EMNEs’ global strategy (Wang et al., 2012), the simultaneous examination of 
their independent, marginal roles is by no means the full mission of the strategy tripod. How 
the three legs interact to shape firms’ global strategy represents the central inquiry which the 
integrative perspective seeks to address. This is predicated on the argument that firms’ 
strategic considerations are holistic in nature, reflected in the constellation of interdependent 
factors. Yet the current empirical research has at best shed light on the interactions of two 
legs out of three (Lu, Liu, and Wang, 2011; Meyer et al., 2009). Given the equivocal findings 
of the EMNE literature on political connections (Meyer et al., 2014), researchers have called 
for contingency explanations (Li et al., 2008; Sun et al., 2012). Some suggest that the desire 
to establish and exploit, and the value of political connections, are dependent on internal 
factors, such as organizational needs, and external factors, such as industry dynamics (Luo, 
2003; Park and Luo, 2001). From a holistic perspective, we identify the strategy tripod 
factors that may help EMNEs overcome institutional distance. 
Institution-based view – political connections. We position political connections as 
the institution-based leg of the strategy tripod. While some consider political connections to 
be firms’ network resources and social capital (Peng and Luo, 2000), we contend that 
political networking represents a series of proactive strategic attempts to engage with 
institutionally embedded agents in pursuit of economic and social return (Luo, 2003). The 
extent to which political networking is attempted and utilized depends on managers’ 
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evaluation of the expected return and costs in response to the external institutional structures 
(Choi et al., 2015; Sojli and Tham, 2017). In this study, we focus on connections with both 
home and host government agents. IB research thus far suggests that network linkages in the 
host country can moderate the negative role of institutional differences faced by MNEs, and 
MNEs having ties with the home government are less constrained by unfavorable host 
institutions (Duanmu, 2014). Firms venturing into a distant country may benefit more from 
connections than do those entering a proximate one, because of the significant degree of 
information asymmetry and lack of legitimacy arising from institutional differences. 
Therefore, we posit that connections with the home and host government agents may be one 
of the key reasons behind EMNEs’ success in overcoming institutional distance. 
Resource-based view – R&D commitment and internationalization experience. It is 
widely argued that EMNEs exploit and/or seek to gain unique resources in foreign expansion 
(Guillén and Garcia-Canal, 2009). Whilst received wisdom suggests that the effect of 
political connections is weakened by the firm’s resources and capabilities (Zhu and Chung, 
2014), we contend that resources and political connections are not necessarily substitutive, 
and they may exhibit more complex relationships. In this study, we focus on two important 
resources for EMNEs, namely, R&D commitment and internationalization experience. 
R&D commitment. IB theory posits that firm-specific intangible assets can 
compensate for liabilities of foreignness when MNEs seek rents overseas (Zaheer, 1995). 
While R&D expenditure and intensity may arguably be less important for EMNEs’ 
international expansion in general, R&D activities are in every respect a crucial way for 
technology firms to enhance competitive advantages in the international market. R&D 
activities reflect a firm’s commitment to innovation, and its competence in providing product 
application solutions, technical training and maintenance services, as well as catering for new 
customers’ needs (Li and Atuahene-Gima, 2002). Commitment to innovation may motivate 
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EMNEs to engage in distant countries, since opportunities for capability upgrading can 
justify the extra costs that firms have to bear. It appears that R&D-intensive firms are less 
reliant on political agents’ support (Zhu and Chung, 2014). However, host country 
governments are often concerned with potential threats that R&D-intensive MNEs may pose, 
including technology leakage and loss of national competitiveness (Globerman and Shapiro, 
2009), making political networking an even more effective channel for attaining legitimacy. 
Moreover, home country governments aiming for globally competitive industries may 
support R&D-intensive domestic firms’ efforts to venture or acquire knowledge abroad. 
These unsettled arguments imply more complex relationships.  
Internationalization experience. Knowledge about how to internationalize and operate 
in foreign markets cannot be easily acquired; rather, it may have to be gained through direct 
experience (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). Experienced firms develop routines and processes 
to estimate costs and returns, and to evaluate and meet the needs of foreign stakeholders 
(Erramilli, 1991). EMNEs are no exception. By entering and operating in distant countries, 
EMNEs learn to cater for formal and informal institutional differences in a foreign territory 
(Cui, Li, and Li, 2013). The combination of the countries in which an EMNE has 
accumulated operational experience determines its capacity to overcome institutional distance 
(Zhou and Guillén, 2015). However, a dilemma arises that, while internationally 
inexperienced firms suffer most from the lack of legitimacy, and thus are more willing to 
engage in political networking, their ability to identify and deploy the right agent in an 
unfamiliar environment may be constrained by experience of internationalization. In addition, 
whether experienced or less experienced firms are more reliant on home political connections 
to acquire state support and informational advantages remains unclear and underexplored.  
Industry-based view – global environmental munificence and dynamism. The 
industry-based view posits that firms’ international expansion strategy is driven by the degree 
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of industrial competition that firms face (Boter and Holmquist, 1996). Competitive dynamics 
affect firms’ performance prospects, which may increase or decrease their willingness to take 
on additional challenges, e.g., institutional distance, unless with the aid of superior resources 
or political connections (Li, Zhou, and Shao, 2009; Luo, 2003). To account for industry 
factors, we focus on two global environmental conditions – environmental munificence (EM) 
and environmental dynamism (ED) – since modern MNEs are nested in industries traversing 
different countries (Nielsen and Nielsen, 2010). A munificent environment has features of 
abundant resources and capacity to support sustained growth (Dess and Beard, 1984). 
Abundant resources attenuate competition intensity, and allow firms to pursue goals other 
than survival (Castrogiovanni, 1991). While EMNEs’ international expansion may be 
constrained by institutional differences and liabilities of foreignness, environmental 
munificence increases their chances of survival in a distant market where they can aim for 
growth by exploiting existing firm-specific advantages or tapping into new knowledge 
sources the environment affords. It is reasonable to envisage that home country governments 
may be particularly keen to encourage domestic firms in munificent industries to venture 
abroad and seize the growth opportunities. Hence industrial characteristics may have 
implications for the effect of home political networking. Conversely, a munificent industry 
may have more room for foreign investors and additional productive capacity, so that EMNEs 
will rely less on host political connections to overcome entry barriers. 
A dynamic environment is characterized by rapid and unpredictable changes in 
technology, market demand, consumer taste and competitive landscape (Lumpkin and Dess, 
1995). It creates a need for firms to engage constantly in innovation in order to maintain a 
competitive position (Miller and Friesen, 1983). While dynamic marketplaces provide more 
opportunities for EMNEs to access new technology, marketing solutions, managerial practice 
and organizational design, frequent but irregular changes make it difficult to predict future 
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states accurately. Whether environmental dynamism enables or inhibits EMNEs’ expansion 
to distant countries may be related to other factors, such as firm-specific resources and 
political strategy. One might argue that dynamic environment requires firms to devote 
resources to product innovation and process adaptation, as opposed to non-market strategies. 
But it is equally conceivable that host political networking may alleviate stakeholders’ 
concerns that EMNEs are intended to source knowledge and outcompete domestic firms in 
this dynamic market (Meyer et al., 2014). Both home and host political connections may also 
help firms acquire informational advantages in regard to industrial regulation, which are 
particularly beneficial for predicting future environmental states in a turbulent market. Next, 
we further explore complementarities of these strategy tripod factors using fuzzy-set analysis. 
METHODS 
Sample and data 
As fast-growing players with institutionally diversified FDIs, Chinese MNEs are likely to 
rely on political connections, given the long tradition of using social ties to coordinate 
transactions at home (Li et al., 2009). Of these, we chose high-tech firms for three reasons. 
First, the Chinese government views technology industries as strategically important, and it 
has an intention to be active in supporting high-tech firm growth (Li and Atuahene-Gima, 
2002). Second, high-tech firms from emerging countries do possess a certain degree of 
technological know-how, driving them to catch up with Western counterparts on R&D 
(Guillén and Garcia-Canal, 2009). Third, because of concerns over technology leakage, high-
tech firms face distinct liabilities of foreignness in less-developed and advanced economies.  
Our sampling frame consisted of all Chinese high-tech manufacturing firms that were 
publicly listed between 2005 and 2011 and had a market capitalization above 50 million US 
dollars (based on 2012 financial reporting). Of the 426 firms identified, we conducted an 
executive survey on their FDI strategy. We asked the respondents to reflect on the latest FDI 
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in order to mitigate memory biases. From June 2012 to March 2013 we received 131 
completed responses, yielding a response rate of 31 percent. Of these, 75 responses were 
valid, as firms provided information on their latest FDI that occurred in the past three years 
(excluding those in Hong Kang, Macau and Taiwan). We examined potential non-response 
bias on a range of firm characteristics (including age, size and ownership), and found no 
significant concern. Combining the survey with secondary data, our final sample includes 75 
Chinese high-tech firms venturing in 28 host countries (see Supplementary Material). 
Research design 
Given our holistic perspective and a focus on the complementarities of strategy tripod factors, 
we follow a set-theoretic approach, utilizing the technique of fuzzy-set qualitative 
comparative analysis (fsQCA). While traditional regression-based analysis is more suited for 
isolating the effect of individual factors, fsQCA models the concept of conjunctural causation 
(Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop, and Paunescu, 2010). Unlike cluster analysis and deviation 
scores, fsQCA allows for a detailed analysis of how causal conditions collectively contribute 
to the outcome in question (Crilly, 2011; Fiss, 2007, 2011). Moreover, fsQCA is suited for 
analysis based on a small-to-medium sized sample (Ragin, 2008). 
Measures and calibration 
Following prior fsQCA studies (Campbell, Sirmon, and Schijven, 2016; Crilly, 2011; Fiss, 
2011; Schneider et al., 2010), we adopt the direct method, using both three-value and four-
value schemes, to calibrate measures of outcomes and causal conditions. For the three-value 
scheme, external standards can be implemented by using specified values of an interval scale 
that correspond to the three key breakpoints of (a) fully in membership, (b) fully out 
membership, and (c) a crossover point (Fiss, 2011; Ragin, 2008). The four-value scheme 
marks “more in than out” as 0.67 and “more out than in” as 0.33, in addition to fully in 
membership (set as 1) and fully out membership (set as 0). The four-value scheme is 
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especially useful in situations where “researchers have a substantial amount of information 
about cases but the evidence is not systematic or strictly comparable from case to case” 
(Ragin, 2008: 31). Calibration anchors are reported in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 Outcomes – high-distance and low-distance investments. We measured high-distance 
investment through the absolute value of institutional distance between home and host 
countries in the focal year, which employs the Institutions Pillar published by the World 
Economic Forum (WEF) in the Global Competitiveness Reports (Shaner and Maznevski, 
2011). The index ranges from 1 to 7, with higher values indicating better-developed 
institutions. We used the WEF index for three reasons. First, the index covers a number of 
dimensions of public and private institutions with weighted average. Differences in both 
public institutions of the wider regulatory environment and private institutions of corporate 
governance and ethics determine the level of unfamiliarity and discrimination hazards that a 
foreign firm faces. Second, the WEF index shows relatively stable scores, with reasonable 
across-period fluctuations for a given country, suggesting consistency of nation-level 
institutions. Lastly, although a range of measurements for institutional distance have been 
employed in previous studies, many arguably suffer from the conflation of institutional 
profile and institutional distance, particularly in the case of a single reference country (van 
Hoorn and Maseland, 2016). The WEF index varies for each country from one year to 
another, and China sits around the middle of the rankings, both of which factors mitigate 
empirical concerns over the profile-distance conflation. When calibrating high-distance 
investment, we followed the approach by Crilly (2011), and relied on external qualitative 
knowledge on judgment, and set 1.2 as the “fully in” anchor for high-distance membership 
(including Canada in 2012, the Netherlands in 2009, etc.), and 0.3 as the “fully out” point for 
high distance membership (including South Korea in 2012, Indonesia in 2012, etc.). Those 
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scoring between 1.2 and 0.7 are considered to have a high degree of membership at the 0.67 
level (“more in than out”; e.g., including Australia in 2011, Italy in 2010). Those between 0.7 
and 0.3 receive 0.33 (“more out than in”; e.g., including Japan 2009, Philippine in 2012). As 
a unique analytical advantage, fuzzy set analysis allows us to analyze separately what relates 
to the negation of the outcome (Campbell et al., 2016). Thus, when calibrating low-distance 
investment, we treated it as negation of high-distance investment, and used an inverse of the 
measure described above (i.e., reverse “fully in” and “fully out” thresholds). 
Institution-based view – home and host political connections. For previously 
employed objective measures of political connections, biases may be introduced when 
objective connections are more tolerable and common in some countries than in others 
(Faccio, 2006). Following prior research on Chinese firms, we focus on managers’ social and 
relational ties with government officials. Specifically, we measure home political connection 
using Peng and Luo’s (2000) three items (with a 7-point Likert scale), where we asked 
executives to describe the extent to which they had utilized personal ties, networks and 
connections over the past three years with a) political leaders in the government, b) officials 
in industrial bureaus, and c) officials in regulatory and supporting organizations. For host 
political connection, we asked executives (using the same scale) about the extent to which 
they utilized political connections in the host country when undertaking their latest FDI (see 
Supplementary Material). The scale reliability is 0.83 for home political connections and 0.79 
for host political connections. For these two factors, we coded membership as “fully in” for a 
response of 5 and above (“slightly extensive” “extensive” or “very extensive”), because all 
three options emphasize the meanings of “extensive”, and “fully out” for a response of 3 or 
below (“slightly little”, “little” or “very little”), because the three options focus on “little” 
(fewer) ties. As we took the mean of three items, those scoring between 5 and 4 are treated as 
0.67 for “more in than out”, while the “more out than in” (0.33) range was between 4 and 3.  
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Resource-based view – R&D commitment and internationalization experience. 
Embracing Jansen, Van den Bosch and Volberda’s (2006) broad view of firm innovation, we 
developed eight items to measure R&D commitment. We asked executives about evaluation 
on items such as “we invent new products and services” and “we experiment with new 
products and services in our local market” (see details in Supplementary Material). Through 
an exploratory factor analysis, we obtained one factor solution and termed it R&D 
commitment. We calibrated 4.75 or below as fully out membership of high R&D 
commitment, and 5.75 and above as fully in membership of high R&D commitment. The 
values between 5.75 and 5.25 are considered to have a high degree of membership at the 0.67 
level. The values between 5.25 and 4.75 receive a low degree of membership at 0.33. The 
comparatively higher scores were adjusted, because sampled high-tech firms generally placed 
higher value on R&D commitment, while listed firms had relatively sufficient financial 
resources to support their R&D activities. For internationalization experience, we adopted Lu 
and Beamish’s (2004) measure of the stock of internationalization experience prior to the 
latest FDI in year t-1. Specifically, we counted a firm’s number of foreign subsidiaries and 
number of foreign countries in which it had invested from its annual reports, and divided 
these two counts by the maximum number of foreign subsidiaries and FDI host countries in 
our sample, respectively, to convert them from counts to ratios. We computed the average of 
these two ratios, so that our measure of internationalization experience ranges from 0 to 1, 
with 1 representing the highest level of experience in our sample. Following Fiss (2011), we 
used distribution-adjusted anchor points of 0.10 (full membership), 0.05 (cross-over point), 
and 0 (full non-membership) to calibrate the level of internationalization experience.  
Industry-based view – global environmental munificence and dynamism. Global 
environmental munificence (EM) and environmental dynamism (ED) were calculated based 
on data from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) database. 
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Following Fernhaber and Patel (2012), we regressed the natural logarithm of industry sales 
on time using a three-year moving window. For EM, we took the anti-log of beta as its 
measure, which represents the average industry growth rate. For ED, we took the anti-log of 
standard error of the beta. Higher standard errors indicate greater environmental 
discontinuities. In calibration, the adjusted data distribution approach was applied (Fiss, 
2011). Industries with values below 0.82 are coded as entirely out of the set of munificent 
environment. The crossover value is set at 0.915, while industries with values above 1.01 are 
coded as entirely in the set of munificent environment. Likewise, setting the crossover point 
at 1.0835, we coded industries with ED value below 1.061 as fully out of high dynamism 
membership and those above 1.106 as fully in high dynamism membership. 
RESULTS 
We started the analysis by testing whether any factor qualifies for necessary conditions for 
high-distance investment, and its negation (low-distance investment), respectively. As shown 
in Table 2, none of the individual factors exceeds the consistency threshold of 0.90 in both 
tests (Greckhamer, 2011; Schneider et al., 2010). Therefore, we confirm that there is no 
individual factor as a necessary condition for both outcomes. In this study, our results are 
based on two sufficiency analyses, of which one is with the set of “high-distance investment” 
outcome, and the other with the negated set of this outcome, “low-distance investment”. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Our study adopts a frequency cutoff at 2.0, and a consistency threshold of 0.861 for 
high-distance investment solutions, and a frequency cutoff at 2.0, and consistency threshold 
of 0.859, for low-distance investment solutions, in accordance with two analytical criteria. 
Firstly, we conducted a sufficiency analysis (see Supplementary Material) using Ragin’s 
(2008) truth table algorithm to identify attribute combinations consistently linked to an 
outcome at the acceptable consistency benchmark of 0.80. When analyzing high-distance 
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investments, we followed Schneider et al. (2010), who choose a threshold that corresponds to 
a gap observed in the distribution of consistency scores; thus, our cut-off point falls in a clear 
gap between the fourth (0.859) and the fifth (0.819) raw consistency values. When analyzing 
low-distance investments, the gap approach is no longer clear. Thus, we adopted two 
complementary consistency measurements simultaneously. One is using the Proportional 
Reduction in Inconsistency (PRI) value – a measure of fit to compute the degree to which a 
solution is sufficient for the outcome rather than the negation of the outcome (Ragin, 2008). 
Given that the truth table shows 57 out of 62 solutions (about 92%) with raw consistency 
values greater than the threshold of 0.80, we adopted a more stringent PRI cut-off score of 
0.70 to rule out simultaneous subset relations of attribute combinations in both the outcome 
and its absence. Further, following Schneider and Wagemann (2012), who propose that the 
“PRODUCT” value of consistency – a result of multiplying the consistency measure and PRI 
– should be used as a complementary consistency measurement. We adopted a higher cut-off 
(0.60) of PRODUCT, which also justifies our selected raw consistency cut-off point as 0.861. 
Table 3 presents the results of our analyses. The configurational solutions are 
presented in the style of Ragin and Fiss (2008), where black circles (●) indicate the presence 
of a condition (or factor), and circled crosses ( ) indicate its absence. Large circles indicate 
core conditions, while small ones are peripheral conditions. Blank spaces indicate ambiguous 
situations, in which the corresponding condition may be either present or absent, and 
therefore they play no significant role in the solution. Based on core conditions (Fiss, 2011; 
Meuer, 2014), Table 3 shows that our analysis results in three major solutions, which further 
indicate the presence of both core and peripheral conditions. We obtain a coverage of 0.41 on 
high-distance investment solutions and 0.57 on low-distance investment solutions. Our 
coverage indicates the empirical importance of the solution as a whole (Crilly, 2011; Ragin, 
2008). When measuring how well a solution corresponds with data, previous studies suggest 
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an acceptable consistency (≥0.80) (Campbell et al., 2016; Fiss, 2011). In this study, our 
individual and overall solutions exhibit acceptable consistency levels. In Table 3, the 
presence of several solutions points to a situation of first-order, or across-type, equifinality of 
solutions (Fiss, 2011). The neutral permutations within solutions 1 (1a and 1b) and solution 4 
(4a and 4b) further illustrate the existence of second-order, or within-type, equifinality. 
Various sensitivity checks, including using higher consistency cut-off, higher frequency cut-
off, different calibration rules, and reduced threshold, support our configurations (details are 
available upon request). 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 Each of four configurations on the left side of Table 3 represents a unique 
combination of internal and external factors that help EMNEs overcome high institutional 
distance in foreign expansion. We also conducted negation analysis, so that the right side of 
Table 3 reports four configurations representing EMNEs’ overcoming low institutional 
distance. Solutions 1a and 1b are identical in core conditions, i.e., the presence of home 
political connections and global environmental munificence, as well as the absence of R&D 
commitment. Yet they differ in peripheral conditions. In Solution 1a, the absence of host 
political connections and internationalization experience and presence of global 
environmental dynamism play contributing roles. Solution 1b features host political 
connections and internationalization experience, and the lack of environmental dynamism, as 
contributing conditions. Solution 2 describes the configuration where host political 
connections and internationalization experience and the absence of R&D commitment play 
central roles, whilst home political connections and environmental dynamism, as well as the 
absence of environmental munificence, play contributing roles. Solution 3 requires R&D 
commitment, global environmental dynamism, and the absence of internationalization 
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experience as core conditions, while the absence of environmental dynamism and presence of 
home and host political connections contribute as peripheral conditions. 
For low-distance investment solutions, Solutions 4a and 4b are identical in core 
conditions (i.e., the presence of host political connections and R&D commitment), but they 
differ at the peripheral level in two industry-based factors (global EM and ED). Solution 4a 
represents a configuration that has home political connections, global ED and absence of 
global EM, as contributing conditions. Solution 4b, as a ‘sister’ permutation, shows one 
difference of presenting global EM but without ED. Solution 5 includes R&D commitment 
and global environmental dynamism as central factors. The presence of home political 
connections and internationalization experience and absence of global environmental 
munificence are peripheral contributing factors. Unlike other low-distance investment 
solutions, Solution 6 requires the presence of global environmental munificence and 
dynamism, but makes absence of institutional and resource factors contributing roles. Below, 
we discuss these configurations in detail by reference to the theories of political connections. 
DISCUSSION 
Home political connections 
Among firms that have overcome high institutional distance in foreign expansion, we identify 
a distinct group of firms relying heavily on home political connections (Solutions 1a and 1b). 
Given the institutional and informational benefits, one might posit that networking with home 
officials should be universally helpful in addressing differences in formal institutions. 
However, our findings suggest otherwise. The importance of home political connections in 
helping firms to overcome high institutional distance depends on the gestalts of other factors. 
The core conditions suggest that firms relying on home ties are only found in munificent 
industries, and they share a lack of commitment to R&D. This is the case where some 
Chinese firms want to capture the emerging opportunities that a fast-growing industry affords 
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yet find themselves incompetent in R&D and innovation when compared to mature 
multinationals and local incumbents. This may be because these firms have specialized in 
low-cost production and now seek to move up the value chain to sustain growth when 
abundant resources in the industrial environment allow (Castrogiovanni, 1991). However, 
institutional distance and the resulting liabilities of foreignness significantly raise the entry 
barrier, making it challenging for firms without strong R&D capacity to tap into resources in 
distant countries. Home political connections become particularly crucial in this context. It is 
well-documented that the Chinese government promotes industrial development by 
supporting domestic firms’ internationalization, and this support compensates for the firms’ 
competitive disadvantages in the global market (Luo et al., 2010). 
 Fuzzy-set analysis allows us not only to identify configurational solutions, but also to 
pinpoint the representative cases in our sample for each solution. Representing Solution 1a, 
Xixia Pump specializes in water pump manufacturing for both petrol and electric 
automobiles. Because of the fast growth in Chinese automobile industry after 2010, Xixia has 
occupied a substantial market share through its matured water pump products. Driven by the 
industrial trend and its limited R&D capability in water pumps of electric vehicle, Xixia, the 
only listed automobile part company in its province, requested favorable FDI policy from the 
local government, and successfully set up its first US subsidiary for product upgrading in 
2012. BYD Co., Ltd., as a representative firm for Solution 1b, has been competing in the 
high-growth electric automobile sector since 2008. While BYD’s patents accumulation is 
largely confined to vehicle manufacturing, the company has ambitions to conquer the global 
electric bus market. With abundant political connections in Shenzhen, where it is 
headquartered, BYD lobbied the local government to support its electric bus 
internationalization with favorable policies, and it was also selected as the exclusive electric 
bus/taxi provider in this city. In 2012, BYD Canada was established to hire local engineers 
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for the testing of electric buses, which served as the springboard to enter developed markets 
and enhance its R&D capability. Both representative firms’ high-distance investments appear 
to be motivated by strategic asset-seeking purposes (Cui et al., 2017), in line with our 
theorization about how home political connections may help internationalizing firms. 
In addition to the core characteristics, we found two sets of peripheral complementary 
conditions. One might note in passing that internationalization experience and the use of host 
political connections are interrelated in this case: firms without internationalization 
experience may be incompetent in developing ties with political agents in a distant country 
and deploying the agents in their own favor. Based on core conditions, we propose that: 
Proposition 1: Home political connections are most useful in helping EMNEs to 
overcome high institutional distance in FDI when the firms operate in a munificent industry 
and lack commitment to R&D. 
Host political connections 
Our analysis reveals another group of Chinese firms that have overcome high institutional 
distance through FDI (Solution 2). Although they also show little commitment to R&D and 
innovation activities, a defining characteristic of this group is their extensive use of host 
political connections, combined with strong internationalization experience. One could argue 
that their foreign venturing in distant countries is not founded upon superior technological 
resources, but upon political capabilities of engaging with host government agents.  
It is unsurprising that the use of host political connections is closely complemented by 
internationalization experience. In institutionally distant countries, foreign EMNEs’ political 
and social legitimacy is often questioned to an extent that threatens the firms’ survival in that 
market. Yet developing and utilizing political networks as a means to tackle this challenge 
carry substantial costs and risks (Siegel, 2007). In general, political connections come with 
the expectation of reciprocity. MNEs may support the political agents’ agenda by providing a 
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range of benefits, including employment, exports, political contributions and personal 
considerations, in exchange for regulatory favors (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994). However, 
in an institutionally distant country, it is difficult for inexperienced firms to identify the right 
form of reciprocity. Firms that have accumulated extensive operational experience in foreign 
markets learn to adapt to the changing institutional environment, and develop institutional 
capabilities regarding international venturing (Zhou and Guillén, 2015). Research confirms 
that institutional knowledge and capabilities of penetrating host country state-business 
networks are transferable across borders (Frynas, Mellahi, and Pigman, 2006). Additionally, 
our analysis reveals the peripheral, contributing roles of home political connections and 
industrial environment. A dynamic yet resource-meager environment renders static resource 
endowments less important and requires responsiveness and flexibility (Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967). For firms without innovation capacities to compete in such an environment, 
seeking forward-looking information through political channels becomes a viable strategy.  
The representative firm for Solution 2, Cooltech Power, is a power-generator 
manufacturer founded in 2002. Being a low-cost producer, Cooltech exports its products to 
most continents. Armed with internationalization experience, Cooltech came to an agreement 
with the government of Singapore in 2007, and started to develop a good relationship with 
host government agents. Since then the company has become a reliable power-generator 
supplier for the Singaporean government. Based on mutual trust between the company and 
host government agents, Cooltech then established its first and the only foreign subsidiary in 
Singapore in 2011. The Singaporean subsidiary works as Cooltech’s sub-headquarters for 
international business, while creating much-desired new employment in the host country. 
Motivated by market-seeking purposes, Cooltech finally gained favourable treatment from 
the Singaporean government and managed to overcome high institutional distance in foreign 
venturing. Based on core conditions, then, we propose that: 
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Proposition 2a: Host political connections are most useful in helping EMNEs to 
overcome high institutional distance in FDI when the firms lack commitment to R&D but 
have accumulated extensive internationalization experience. 
Consistent with the assumption of asymmetric causality, our negation analysis reveals 
distinct configurations of the strategy tripod factors associated with Chinese technology firms 
investing in low-distance countries. We identify a group of firms that simultaneously utilize 
host political connections and commit to R&D activities (Solutions 4a and 4b). 
Independently, each of the market and non-market strategies should be of use in this context. 
Low institutional distance reduces the uncertainty that foreign firms face when engaging with 
local political agents (Mudambi and Navarra, 2002). Familiarity with the structure of policy 
making and economic institutions allows the firm to identify the right agent who would 
appreciate the reciprocal benefits the firm brings to the table, and also feed it with useful 
insider information upon which competitive advantages can be based (Boddewyn and 
Brewer, 1994). On the other hand, the institutional compatibility between home and host 
locations determines the firm’s capacity to gain insider status in the local business network 
(Cantwell, 2009). When firms are deeply embedded in dense networks of production, 
information flow through the supply chain improves focal firms’ knowledge acquisition, 
making product innovation and process adaptation more efficient (Johanson and Vahlne, 
2009). R&D-intensive firms are more attracted to locations where investment in innovation 
tends to be more efficient and generates a higher return. 
However, our configurational approach suggests that market and non-market 
strategies are mutually reinforcing in this context. Government officials are more receptive to 
R&D-intensive MNEs originating from an institutionally proximate country because of 
familiarity and compatibility. R&D firms also tend to attach more importance to the 
endorsement of host political agents, since this enhances their legitimacy and credibility as 
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viewed by the local business network. The more embedded in the business network, the more 
efficient their R&D activities will be. It could be inferred from this pattern that low-distance 
investment may not incur negligible costs and liabilities. Instead, it poses some threshold 
requirements for foreign investment, and some firms are better positioned to overcome these 
thresholds and seize opportunities in institutionally proximate countries. The representative 
firm for Solution 4a, Silan Electronics, specializes in integrated circuit manufacturing. While 
the integrated circuit industry requires continuous R&D investment, its global growth 
potential is limited because of industrial maturity. To increase market share overseas, Silan 
has to rely heavily on political connections in targeted host countries. In the last decade, there 
were several diplomatic incidents between South Korea and Japan that forced Korean MNEs 
to change electronic part suppliers from Japan to other countries. After receiving this 
“message” from proximate politician(s), in 2009, Silan established its first Asian subsidiary 
in South Korea with support from the Korean government. Acquired legitimacy helped the 
firm gradually increase its sales, and it became the largest foreign integrated circuit supplier 
in this country. Sany Heavy Machinery Co., Ltd., the representative firm for Solution 4b, is 
one of the largest construction machinery manufacturers in the world. To capture the growth 
trend in South America, Sany accepted an invitation from the Brazilian government, and built 
a factory with a R&D center there in 2012. A good relationship with Brazilian politicians 
conferred on Sany strong legitimacy, and helped the firm exploit ownership advantages in a 
foreign country. Motivated primarily by market-seeking purposes, both representative firms 
for Solutions 4a and 4b ventured into low-distance countries through enhanced legitimacy in 
host countries. Based on core conditions, we propose: 
Proposition 2b: Host political connections are most useful in helping EMNEs to 




Transfer of political connections across institutional contexts 
Solutions 3 and 5 identify two distinct groups of firms investing in high-distance and low-
distance countries, respectively. Despite the opposing foreign contexts in which they venture, 
these two groups share some important characteristics. Both operate in highly dynamic 
industries, and both commit heavily to R&D. Dynamic marketplaces confer ample 
opportunities on EMNEs to acquire new technological, marketing and managerial expertise, 
and to compete with incumbent firms by providing novel product and process solutions, in 
both high and low distance countries. It is well-documented that, in a dynamic environment, 
rapid and unpredictable changes in market demand, consumer taste and competitive tactics 
undermine the effectiveness of established resources and routines (Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967). To ensure survival, firms need to maintain competitive flexibility in and 
responsiveness to the market (Miller and Friesen, 1983). Investing in innovation then 
becomes a relevant strategy. One could argue that Solutions 3 and 5 point to the cases where 
institutional distance poses fewer constraints for EMNEs, and foreign venturing depends on 
the firms’ capacity to respond to dynamic market changes. To a lesser extent, these firms are 
all well-connected with home political agents and deploy political aids for their own benefit.  
 However, comparing Solution 3 with Solution 5 reveals an interesting change in the 
efficacy of host political connections. In low-distance countries, resource-based advantages 
are less likely to be impaired by unfamiliarity and discriminating hazards. Latecomer 
innovators compete in the market solely on product innovation and process adaptation, and 
they seldom resort to ties with local political agents. Since developing and maintaining host 
political connections require reciprocal favors and incur significant costs, these becomes 
dispensable to firms that focus on market capabilities. In contrast, in high-distance countries, 
host political connection is regarded as important, and it is employed by innovation-oriented 
EMNEs. It is conceivable that, while these firms tend to base competitive advantages on 
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innovative products and processes in this particular environment, locally embedded ties with 
political agents afford some positive utility in a far-removed institution where foreign firms 
suffer from information asymmetry and discriminatory treatment at the hands of various 
stakeholders. This is especially the case when R&D-intensive firms seek to source new 
knowledge from a foreign knowledge cluster. Very often such activities are perceived 
negatively by stakeholders; motivations are questioned and potential benefits ignored. The 
intended reverse knowledge transfer to the headquarters could be interpreted as a case of 
technology leakage (Meyer et al., 2014). Political legitimacy becomes crucial under these 
circumstances, and the lack of that attracts additional regulatory pressures. Engaging with 
selected local political agents lifts regulatory burdens and enhances the firms’ trustworthiness 
in the eyes of many other stakeholders, making it a viable strategy in theory.  
 Our findings suggest that, in reality, these benefits outweigh the costs of developing 
political connections in the absence of internationalization experience. As a representative 
firm for Solution 5, Changhong Co. Ltd. is a leading home appliance manufacturer in China, 
with multi-country operations overseas. Changhong entered the United Arab Emirates market 
in 2010, and successfully met local customers’ needs with its quality home appliances, as a 
result of continuous investment in R&D. In contrast, Yiling Pharmaceutical (Solution 3) had 
to rely on political connections in the UK to overcome high institutional distance in 2011. In 
response to reverse knowledge transfer concerns from the British government, Yiling 
accepted suggestions from local governmental agents, and built a medical research center 
with Cardiff University. Thus, R&D outputs in the UK subsidiary are shared with the local 
community, while Yiling also created new jobs to further satisfy the host government. 
Networking with political agents helped Yiling obtain informational advantages and enhance 
its legitimacy in a far-removed institutional environment. While host political connection is 
in the configuration (Solution 5) sufficient for latecomer innovators to overcome high 
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institutional distance in FDI, its promotional role disappears when similar firms venture into 
low-distance countries. The importance of host political connection seems replaced by some 
degree of internationalization experience. Hence: 
Proposition 3: For R&D-intensive firms operating in a highly dynamic industry, host 
political connections represent an important asset in high institutional distance countries and 
become dispensable in low institutional distance countries. 
Theoretical contributions 
Why and how MNEs can overcome “costs of doing business abroad” or “liability of 
foreignness” has been an intriguing question for IB scholars (Eden and Miller, 2004; Zaheer, 
1995). Through the lens of the strategy tripod perspective, we extend previous studies by 
explicating the efficacy of political connections in overcoming institutional distance under 
varying complementary conditions, and offer insights into several lines of IB literature. 
First, we extend the non-market strategy literature regarding political connections. 
Previous research has primarily theorized political connection as a substitute for market-
supporting institutional infrastructures in emerging countries (Li et al., 2008; Luo, 2003). 
Less discussed are the complementary conditions for political connections required to 
overcome institutional barriers to EMNEs’ internationalization. To fill this gap, we argue that 
home and host connections provide distinct mechanisms through which firms can mitigate 
liabilities of foreignness arising from institutional distance, and that the cost and benefit of 
political networking are not constant for all firms. Our configurational analyses suggest that, 
while political networking is useful for EMNEs’ internationalization, its importance crucially 
depends on constellations of complementary conditions. For instance, R&D-intensive firms 
are best placed to extract benefits from political networking with host officials when 
venturing into low-distance countries (Solutions 4a and 4b). This is because developing and 
maintaining political ties at home and abroad entail significant cost, commitment and risk. 
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Only when the anticipated benefits outweigh the costs would managers choose to employ 
such a non-market strategy. This tradeoff is both firm- and industry-specific. Moreover, the 
extant contingency perspective in the non-market strategy literature focuses on the presence 
of certain factors that condition the value of political ties (Sun et al., 2012). Our analysis also 
suggests that, for a given type of connection to attain great importance, certain factors must 
be non-existent. For instance, in an institutionally distant country, non-R&D firms may find 
themselves in a better position to establish links with host political agents through which the 
firms can enhance political legitimacy and exploit information asymmetry at the expense of 
competitors (Solution 2). This is because R&D-intensive foreign technology firms are more 
likely to be perceived negatively, and associated more with threats than opportunities, 
including technology leakage and loss of competitiveness of the domestic industry 
(Globerman and Shapiro, 2009). We clearly show that, in any given institutional context, the 
perceived usefulness of political ties is not uniform, but a distinct function of the presence 
and absence of complementary resource and industry conditions.  
Our comparative analysis of firms venturing in high-distance and low-distance 
countries yields two important insights. First, we show that, given similar complementary 
conditions, the efficacy of connection could change across institutional settings (Solutions 3 
and 5). This affirms the conjectures by previous studies (Dieleman and Boddewyn, 2012; Li 
et al., 2009; Meyer et al., 2014). However, we bring much-needed nuance to this conclusion. 
Only for R&D-intensive firms operating in a highly dynamic industry would host political 
networking switch from an important non-market strategy to a dispensable one as 
institutional difference decreases. Second, the mechanisms through which host political 
connections benefit EMNEs differ, depending on the institutional distance between the home 
and host country, so that, for the same type of connections to be useful, different 
complementary conditions are required (Solutions 2 and 4). In high-distance countries, 
32 
 
legitimacy deficiency is a salient issue. EMNEs suffer from inherent liabilities of foreignness 
and discrimination hazards in a host environment where formal institutional infrastructures 
depart vastly from those of the home country (Eden and Miller, 2004). Under these 
circumstances, internationalization experience becomes an important complementary 
condition for firms to grasp the nuance of political networking. For instance, some political 
behavior considered normal in the home country, such as internalizing the political agents 
into the firm’s hierarchy or making political contributions, may be legally restricted and may 
undermine legitimacy in a different country (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994). The expected 
costs and uncertainty in relation to political networking would deter the use of such non-
market strategies by inexperienced EMNEs to overcome institutional distance. In low-
distance countries, legitimacy becomes less a concern, and benefits of host political 
networking accrue mainly from informational advantages. Formal regulations and the rules 
with which competition is organized are similar between two proximate institutions, making 
it easier for firms to embed themselves in the local production network. Nevertheless, the 
policy environment poses potential threats to the existing market structure on which exchange 
relationships are based (Choi et al., 2015). As a means to tackle external uncertainty, host 
political connections provide crucial information on how to deal with upcoming regulatory 
changes and even take advantage of potential political interference. In this case, the efficacy 
of host political networking is the highest for R&D-intensive firms whose innovation 
efficiency crucially depends on relations with the local supply chain partners.  
Second, we contribute to the literature on institutional distance in IB. Much of the 
extant research views home-host institutional distance as an explanans of various strategies, 
including investment location, entry mode and ownership level. While IB researchers agree 
that home-host institutional distance poses significant challenges to MNEs, it remains unclear 
why some EMNEs – given their inadequate resources and capabilities in general – are not 
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constrained by institutional distance. Through identifying configurations of causal conditions 
pertaining to firms embracing great institutional differences, we extend the knowledge about 
EMNEs’ capacity to overcome institutional distance in international expansion. Moreover, 
previous studies assume that low institutional distance investments involve negligible costs 
due to the linear effect of distance embedded in regression-based methods. One implication is 
that the factors causing high-distance and low-distance investments are symmetric: low-
distance investments are caused by what fails to overcome significant institutional distance. 
Our empirical results relax this assumption by identifying four distinct configurations 
associated with EMNEs’ low-distance FDI that are not the opposite of what guarantees high-
distance investments. It is differences in kind rather than those in level that explain variances 
in foreign entry. Our findings also corroborate the existence of threshold requirements for 
MNEs’ expansion into institutionally proximate environments. Managers ignoring this 
threshold often fall into the overconfidence trap (O'Grady and Lane, 1996). 
However, it is worth noting that the results do not completely nullify the linearity 
assumption. Solutions 1a and 6 represent a comparable pair of configurations across two 
opposing institutional contexts. Both are resource-meager, and operate in dynamic and 
munificent industries. A striking difference is that home political connection is an important 
asset in institutionally distant countries, but it turns into a liability in proximate ones. 
Significant costs and liabilities of foreignness are expected for resource-meager and 
inexperienced Chinese firms to operate in a far-removed institutional environment. 
Institutional support from home political agents becomes an important substitute for firm-
specific intangibles (Cui and Jiang, 2012). Financial aid and administrative assistance are 
commonly offered by the Chinese government to promote internationalization and industrial 
catch-up (Luo et al., 2010). These, to a large extent, offset the extra costs arising from 
distance-induced uncertainty, unfamiliarity and discrimination that firms have to bear. In 
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contrast, our sampled Chinese technology firms venturing in institutionally proximate 
countries do not possess home political connections. While it seems that low institutional 
distance poses negligible cost to foreign firms, as many have assumed, we stress that the 
configuration of industry-based conditions has to be met before claiming this conclusion.  
Third, we contribute to the strategy tripod literature by testing its three legs (resource, 
industry, and institution) simultaneously and generating equifinal configurations for EMNEs’ 
international expansion strategy. It has been well argued that studying the global strategies of 
MNEs and particularly EMNEs needs to combine wisdoms from three theoretical traditions: 
the industry-based, resource-based and institution-based views (Peng et al., 2009; Peng, 
Wang, and Jiang, 2008). Yet very few studies have integrated these theoretical strands in 
empirical testing. Our set-theoretic approach facilitates the empirical investigation of 
complex interdependencies, and illustrates that EMNEs’ capacity to embrace institutional 
differences is contingent on the overall configurations of institutional, resource and industry 
factors. As the first paper testing three-leg interactions simultaneously, our study attests to the 
theoretical efficacy of the strategy tripod perspective and extends the application of this 
framework in IB. 
Limitations and future research 
Limitations of this study lead to several future research directions. First, following the 
convention (Eden and Miller, 2004; Zhou and Guillen, 2016), we focus mainly on the cost 
implications and liability of foreignness in conceptualizing institutional distance. Rooted in 
the new institutional economics, this view has a closer bearing on political connections, as 
well as our research questions. That said, recent Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) studies argue 
that institutional difference may incur benefits through the exploitation of comparative 
advantages (e.g., Jackson and Deeg, 2008; Witt and Jackson, 2016). We call for future 
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research to incorporate both cost and benefit dimensions of institutional difference to yield 
new insights into specific constraints on EMNEs’ cross-border transfer of practices.  
Second, while we do not explicitly claim that political networking is valuable in the 
sense that it would contribute to the success of foreign venturing, recent studies have 
examined the performance implications of foreign political connections (Sojli and Tham, 
2017) and particularly for cross-border mergers and acquisitions (Brockman et al., 2013). We 
encourage future research to conjoin our work with this line of inquiry to investigate varying 
complementary conditions that would enhance the value-creating effect of political 
networking in response to different institutional settings.  
Finally, we note that the tripod configurations may change over time, especially given 
the on-going institutional transition in emerging economies that influence not only resource 
availability for strategic initiatives but also resource utilization and industrial conditions. 
Future research may incorporate the time dimension into the theoretical framework and 
empirical design to examine the dynamic three-leg interactions for EMNEs’ global strategies. 
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Table 1. Calibration of sets 
Type Variable Measurement & data source Calibration method 
Fuzzy 




The Institutions Pillar provided by the WEF 
index in the Global Competitiveness Reports in 
relevant years of FDI entries 
1.2, 0.7, 0.3  4 
Qualitative judgment for anchor 
points following institutional distance 
indexed from the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) in the Global 
Competitiveness Reports; see Crilly 
(2011) 






A 3-item scale (α =0.83) from Peng and Luo 
(2000) 5, 4, 3 4 
Standard Likert scale approach. See 
Ragin (2008)  
Host political 
connections 
A 3-item scale (α =0.79) from Peng and Luo 
(2000) 5, 4, 3 4 
Standard Likert scale approach. See 
Ragin (2008) and Fiss (2011) 
Resource-
based view 




anchor points following Fiss (2011) 
Internationalization 
experience 
A ratio-based measure from Lu and Beamish 
(2004) 0.10, 0.05, 0 3 
Distribution-adjusted calibration 





Calculated each year with moving three-year 
windows data obtained from the UNIDO 




anchor points following Fiss (2011) 
Global environmental 
dynamism 
As above 1.106, 
1.0835,1.061 3 
Distribution-adjusted calibration 




Table 2. Necessary conditions 
 
Causal configurational solutions 
High-distance investment  Low-distance investment 
Consistency Coverage  Consistency Coverage 
Institution-based view      
Home political connections 0.66 0.46  0.76 0.75 
Host political connections 0.61 0.48  0.70 0.77 
Resource-based view      
R&D commitment 0.56 0.44  0.67 0.75 
Internationalization experience 0.53 0.43  0.53 0.62 
Industry-based view      
Global environmental munificence 0.66 0.43  0.70 0.64 
Global environmental dynamism 0.49 0.49  0.44 0.62 









Table 3. Configurational solutions 
Strategy Tripod Framework 
High-distance investment Low-distance investment 
Solution 1a Solution 1b Solution 2 Solution 3 Solution 4a Solution 4b Solution 5 Solution 6 
Institution-based view 
Home political connections         
Host political connections         
Resource-based view 
R&D commitment         
Internationalization experience         
Industry-based view 
Global environmental munificence         
Global environmental dynamism         
Consistency 0.89 0.86 0.91 0.87 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.86 
Raw Coverage 0.13 0.22 0.14 0.18 0.20 0.37 0.15 0.09 
Unique Coverage 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.03 
Overall Solution Consistency 0.82 0.83 
Overall Solution Coverage 0.41 0.57 
Note: 1) Black circles indicate the presence of a condition, and circles with "X" indicate its absence. Large circles indicate core conditions; small ones, peripheral conditions. 
Blank spaces indicate "don't care". 2) Prime Implicants (High-distance investment) = ~ R&D Comm.* HomeTies * GEM (that is, appear in Solutions 1a +1b); Prime 
Implicants (Low-distance investment) = R&D Comm. * HostTies + GEM * GED * ~HomeTies (that is, appear in Solutions 1a +1b+3).  
